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| Article |
| A Paradox in Locke’s Theory of Natural Rights |
| Jeffrie Murphy |
| 8 Dialogue 256 (1969) |
| Library Access |
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Abstract: This article argues that upon any acceptable interpretation of at least one of John Locke’s central natural rights claims, this claim will not be able to perform the crucial task envisioned for it by Locke – namely, provide a key premise for the moral justification for passing from a pre-civil society to a civil society that is responsible to its citizens. Correspondingly, any interpretation of Locke’s claim which would justify this transition renders this claim unintelligible as a natural right claim. It concludes that Locke’s argument of a natural right to punish, the natural right of execution, is such an inconsistent claim. The notion of a natural right to punish is unintelligible. Therefore, upon any plausible interpretation of punishment, it is wrong to say that we have a natural right to punish. Immanuel Kant’s theory, that we have a natural need to punish but no natural right, avoids the mistakes of Locke’s account. |
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