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Abstract: The grand conception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) entails a gradual move toward generally open trade in goods, with state intervention in international commerce both reduced and constrained. However, GATT authorizes a variety of safeguard measures (SGMs), formal procedures by which governments may, in exceptional situations, suspend or withdraw GATT commitments affecting particular products and industries. GATT also authorizes governments to impose special tariffs known as antidumping measures (ADMs) on imported goods that are, under highly technical criteria, priced inappropriately low. Similar measures are permitted in response to many foreign government subsidies. By the time of the Uruguay Round, formal SGMs were rare. Their role had been usurped by “voluntary restraint agreements” under which exports were “voluntarily” restrained by the exporting nation. ADMs had also become the trade remedy of choice for import-competing firms and their governments in the West. These trade remedies were all addressed in the Uruguay Round.
This paper describes recent trends in the use of trade remedies, reviews the relevant policy issues, and analyzes the rules adopted in the Uruguay Round. Growing reliance on ADMs by the West and developing countries threatens the goals of liberalization, transparency, and nondiscrimination in the multilateral trading system. The use of ADMs in the West should be constrained and, if possible, rolled back. Developing countries should also be dissuaded from using ADMs. The paper also discusses the World Trade Organization dispute settlement procedures, which will be the principal way developing-country Uruguay Round commitments are enforced.
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