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Abstract: According to the United States Supreme Court, the "restriction on state sovereign power [to render judgments against a nonresident defendant] must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment]. ... " While the Court may not have explicitly confirmed this rule until 1850, the service of process requirement operated as the basic jurisdictional rule in interstate recognition cases from a much earlier time. In addition, purging the jurisdictional rules of all interstate federalism elements that could not be readily explained in due process terms would result in an administratively untenable dual jurisdictional system, unless the Due Process Clause were also deemed to be the sole source of authority for jurisdictional rules in interstate recognition cases. As suggested above, the substantial restriction on state court jurisdiction imposed by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen is much more easily justified as an application of federal common law protecting interstate federalism than as a constitutional due process requirement. Recognizing constitutional structure as the primary source of authority for the interstate federalism aspects of current doctrine would also better explain the special rules relating to divorce and land decrees than does the Court's current insistence on the Due Process Clause as the sole source of authority for the personal jurisdiction requirement.
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