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Abstract: The nuclear nonproliferation regime worked well for its first 25 years, converting the spread of nuclear weapons from an act of national pride into an act of international outlawry. Today, however, the nuclear nonproliferation regime is on the verge of collapse. Drawing from six case studies (India, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea) and historical data that has recently become available, this Article derives three key lessons applicable to restoring the nuclear nonproliferation regime's capacity to prevent proliferation. The Article illustrates how the regime's weak verification authorities have caused it persistent difficulty in catching violators, and it suggests how to strengthen these authorities. The Article also demonstrates how strong sanctions have in the past succeeded in stopping or slowing the progress of illicit nuclear weapons programs (including those of Libya, Iraq and, for twenty years, India). In addition, the Article describes the international community's recent failures to seriously sanction states caught violating the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Article analyzes in detail the weaknesses of Security Council Resolution 1718 (imposed on North Korea in October 2006), Security Council Resolution 1737 (imposed on Iran in December 2006) and Security Council Resolution 1747 (imposed on Iran in March 2007). It points out that the sanctions imposed on North Korea and Iran by these resolutions are far weaker than the sanctions which stopped the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear weapons program.
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