|
Article
|
|
Political Control and the Forms of Agency Independence
|
|
Jennifer Selin and David E. Lewis
|
|
83 George Washington Law Review 1487 (2015)
|
|
|
|
Open Access | Library Access
|
|
Abstract: The legitimacy of the federal executive establishment’s administrative policies hinges on the ability of democratically elected officials to hold federal agencies accountable. While both the President and Congress have a variety of tools they can employ to enhance control over the bureaucracy, elected officials have chosen to insulate some agencies from politics. Courts and legal scholars have focused a lot of attention on what constitutes an “independent” agency and what consequences this should have for jurisprudence. In this Article, we explore decisions to insulate agencies from political control by examining the statutory features of 321 agencies and bureaus in the federal executive establishment. Our analysis of a broad range of statutes suggests that there is substantial and underappreciated variation in the structural characteristics that influence the accountability of federal agencies to the President and Congress. These characteristics change over time, influence administrative policy, and have implications for judicial deference to federal regulations.
|
|
|